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 1 Introduction
During the Renaissance, many Mediterranean cities created ￿nancial enti-
ties known as exchange banks. The purpose of these banks was to insulate
their host cities￿commercial payments systems from the vagaries of frac-
tional reserve banking.1 Exchange banks had full reserves and did not issue
banknotes. Commercial debts could be settled by the transfer of deposits
between bank accounts without the risk of the bank failing. Coins held in the
bank were secure against theft and did not have to be repeatedly assayed.
In 1609, Amsterdam opened the ￿rst exchange bank in northern Europe.
The principal purpose of the Bank of Amsterdam, however, was not to
protect against the failure of private banks, but, instead, to discourage the
circulation of debased coins (van Dillen 1934, 80).2 Our argument is that
the Bank of Amsterdam, called the Wisselbank in Dutch, was ultimately
successful in its goal. As a consequence, the Dutch Republic was able to
maintain a stable system of coinage for roughly 150 years, and Wisselbank
money became the foundation of European commerce and ￿nance.3 As late
as 1776, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations praised the money of the
Wisselbank for ￿its intrinsic superiority to currency.￿
At the turn of the 17th century, Amsterdam su⁄ered from a debasement
problem because of the interactions between coins and commercial credit.
As a small, open economy, the Dutch Republic was awash in a variety of
coins, so local o¢ cials repeatedly set ordinances that speci￿ed ￿legal￿values
for coins, i.e., the value of speci￿c coins in the settlement of debts. The
goal was to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty, and, by 1600, these
ordinances covered nearly 800 foreign coins (Dehing and ￿ t Hart 1997: 40).
The ordinances, however, created an incentive for mints to debase coins, for
the debased coins could be brought to Amsterdam and passed to creditors at
ordinance prices. Creditors su⁄ered because commercial credits were repaid
with lighter-than-expected coins. And when credit su⁄ered, Amsterdam
su⁄ered.
To model the cause of debasement in the Dutch case, we draw on theoret-
ical frameworks developed in Sargent and Smith (1997), Sargent and Velde
1The ￿rst exchange bank was in Barcelona in 1401, followed by Genoa in 1407, Valencia
in 1408 and, much later, Venice in 1587. See Mueller (1997, 116-8).
2Roughly simultaneously with the founding of the Bank of Amsterdam, Amsterdam did
attempt to outlaw private banks. This attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. See Dehing
and ￿ t Hart (1997, 46).
3One measure of the Wisselbank￿ s success was its ability to inspire the creation of
similar institutions across northern Europe (Delft, Hamburg, Middelburg, Nuremberg,
Rotterdam, and Stockholm).
1(2002), and Sussman and Zeira (2003).4 What is new in our setup, however,
is that the impetus for debasement does not arise from physical deterioration
of coins (Sargent-Smith), tensions between large and small coins (Sargent-
Velde), nor from asymmetric information about the precious metal content
of coinage (Sussman-Zeira). Instead, debasement arises as a form of taxation
that can be applied to commercial credit. To link debasement to commercial
credit, we introduce a Freeman (1996)-style overlapping-generations model
with the feature that coins used to settle debts can be debased after a debt
is created.
In our approach, incentives to debase arise because mints and debtors
share the surplus that a debasement extracts from creditors. Moreover, the
model demonstrates that incentives to debase can occur, even when the
value of full-weight coins are free to rise in spot transactions because, again,
the ordinances allow creditors to be taxed. Debasement can also cause
in￿ ation because the local economy is tied to the world economy. Following
a debasement, goods producers with export opportunities will demand more
light coins so as to get an amount of silver similar to what the rest of the
world o⁄ers for their goods. The combination of in￿ ation and the loss of
silver from seigniorage create an increased nominal demand for the debased
coins with two important consequences: (1) the local economy must export
goods to gain additional silver, and (2) the new coins will be of the debased
variety, so a sort of ￿Gresham￿ s Law￿e⁄ect arises.5
A second version of our model then shows how an institution such as
the Wisselbank discourages debasement through a modi￿cation of the legal
concept of money. In this version, the value of bank money is tied to the
legal value of ￿heavy￿coins, and the value of a deposited coin is assessed, to
a ￿rst approximation, by the intrinsic content of deposited coin relative to
the bank￿ s reference coin.6 To compel participation, all commercial credit
transactions must be settled via the bank. The result for creditors is that a
stable unit of account for debt settlement is retained while the silver content
of the coins used for settlement is also guaranteed. In turn, the incentive
to debase is blunted because debtors now bear the costs of the debasement
when they attempt to settle debts using debased coin.
Ultimately Wisselbank deposits began to resemble what is now called
outside money. The right to withdraw deposits was eliminated, and the
4Velde and Weber (2000) employ a related framework in their analysis of bimetallic
standards.
5We use the term ￿Gresham￿ s Law￿ with considerable caution, as there are other
features of our model that are inconsistent with this law as it is often interpreted.
6The ￿weight￿of coins is de￿ned more precisely below.
2value of Wisselbank funds was maintained by open market trades of bank
funds against claims for coin or precious metal. The second version of our
model incorporates these important institutional changes.
2 Historical Background7
The modern notion of ￿money￿incorporates at least three distinct concepts:
a unit of account, inside money, and outside money. In ordinary commerce
these are often taken as synonymous: a dollar bill is seen as having the same
value as a dollar in the bank, and both of these are treated as ￿one dollar￿in
everyday ￿nancial calculations. To people living in Early Modern Europe,
however, the distinctions between these concepts were readily apparent be-
cause of the instability of multi-coin, commodity-based systems. Monetary
systems were routinely formed with a standard coin as the unit of account,
but frequently some shock drove the standard coin out of circulation while
leaving the unit of account in continued use.8
Units of account outlasted their coin because debt contracts continued to
be denominated in the relevant unit of account. In the Dutch case, the 1543
silver ￿ orin of Charles V was a coin set to be worth twenty stuiver coins, but
the debasement of stuivers drove ￿ orins out of circulation (see Dehing and
￿ t Hart 1997, 38; van Dillen 1934, 82). By the founding of the Wisselbank
in 1609, the unit of account in most of the Dutch Republic remained the
￿ orin (also called the gulden or guilder) despite there no longer being ￿ orin
coins. The value of coins and ￿nancial obligations were all de￿ned in terms
of the ￿ orin.
The analog of outside money was coin. Coin circulating within the Re-
public consisted of both domestic and foreign coins. Most circulating coins
were given lawful status, i.e., they were assigned a speci￿c value in terms
of ￿ orins, by a minting ordinance.9 In this sense, the intent of the minting
ordinance was that coins should circulate by ￿tale￿and not by the weight
of the precious metal contained in each coin. However, the intrinsic value of
7Appendix B presents a brief chronology of the Bank of Amsterdam. Some historical
balance sheets are given in Appendix C. Appendix D contains a glossary of some relevant
historical money and banking terms.
8For the example, the French Øcu of 1577 came to cease circulating yet operated as a
unit of account for 25 years (Sargent and Velde 2002, 211).
9Not all foreign coins were given legal status. Coins with very low ￿ne metal content,
as well as clipped and worn coins, were declared to be unlawful. However, the political
structures of the Republic did not provide su¢ cient authority for a blanket ban on the
circulation of foreign coinage.
3the coins placed some speci￿c limits on the government￿ s ability to set the
relative values of the various coins in circulation. When these limits were
surpassed, as often occurred in the early years of the Republic, the heav-
ier coins would disappear from a circulation, and a new minting ordinance
would be passed in response.
Minting standards were quite lax in the early years of the Republic.
The Union of Utrecht in 1579 sought to end competitive debasements be-
tween provinces, but the confederate structure of the Republic allowed eight
provincial mints (the province of Holland had two) and six municipal mints
to produce coin within the Republic￿ s boundaries (Dehing and ￿ t Hart, 1997,
38). Moreover, numerous mints produced small coins for local transactions,
so the total number of mints in the Republic was approximately forty (Ko-
rthals Altes 2001, 41). Mints were often run with an eye more towards the
production of seigniorage for their respective governments, than towards
maintaining a stable monetary standard (de Vries and van der Woude 1997,
82). The mints operated by governments outside the Republic were even less
interested in, not to say openly hostile to, the idea of stable money. Coins
produced at nearby foreign mints often had a smaller metallic content, rela-
tive to their nominal value, than coins issued within the Republic. In some
cases, the foreign coins were explicitly created to be lighter-weight copies
of domestic coins. Contemporary accounts describe a ￿massive￿in￿ ow of
these light coins (e.g., de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 83).
Most commercial transactions, however, did not take place in coin, but
rather in privately issued claims or inside money. Generally, two types of in-
side money existed: bank money and bills of exchange. Bank money existed
as claims on the accounts of cashiers (moneychangers who took deposits) op-
erating in commercial centers such as Amsterdam. Cashiers o⁄ered a variety
of payment services. Just as in modern times, a merchant could discharge
a debt by transferring money in his bank account to this creditor. These
transfers could circulate hand-to-hand outside of the bank by endorsement,
and cashiers even issued deposit notes payable to bearer (Dehing and ￿ t
Hart, 1997, 43). Bank accounts were not reckoned in any particular coin,
however, but in the unit of account, the ￿ orin.
The cashiers were legally required to exchange coins at the ratios spec-
i￿ed in the minting ordinance, but this requirement was not e⁄ective. In
particular, two practices that deviated from this obligation were widely con-
demned, but apparently just as widely tolerated in the marketplace. The
￿rst practice, known as steygeringhe (roughly translatable as ￿overvalua-
tion￿or ￿gouging￿ ), was to value coins at ratios di⁄erent from those assigned
in the minting ordinance, with a premium being assigned to heavier-weight
4coins. The second, known as bicquetteeren (roughly, ￿cherry-picking￿ ) con-
sisted of holding back coins with a heavy metallic content relative to their
nominal value, and paying out only lighter weight coins. The prevalence of
these practices meant that money in cashiers￿accounts was often de facto
payable only in debased coin, or in heavy coin if the depositor was willing
to pay a premium (van Dillen 1934; Korthals Altes 2001).
International payments and the bulk of commercial credit were not pro-
vided by moneychangers, but, instead, by a second type of inside money
called the bill of exchange (de Vries and van der Woude 1997: 134). While
there are many technical aspects of bills of exchange, for the purposes of
this paper, we may think of the drawing of a bill simply as the issuance of
a transferable (￿negotiable￿ ) debt obligation. Although the bill might be
issued or ￿drawn￿at a remote location, it was typically payable through a
cashier at a commercial center such as Amsterdam.
2.1 The problem of debasement
To summarize, the monetary system prevalent in the Dutch Republic at
the start of the 17th century consisted of a unit of account, domestic and
foreign coins, and inside money in the form of cashiers￿accounts and bills
of exchange. For some purposes, this system was quite passable. But it
possessed a major ￿ aw, noted by Adam Smith ([1776] 1994, 510):
[T]he currency of a small state ... can seldom consist altogether
in its own coin, but must be made up, in great measure, of
the coins of all the neighboring states ... . If foreign bills of
exchange are paid in this currency, the uncertain value of any
sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain, must render the
exchange always very much against such a state, its currency
being, in all foreign states, necessarily valued even below what
it is worth.
In other words, a sum payable in ￿ orins (on the accounts of a typical
moneychanger) might correspond to di⁄erent types of coin, each with dif-
ferent values in international exchange, a situation hardly to the liking of
parties holding bills payable in such sums.
The Republic￿ s ￿rst line of defense against this problem was to pass a
minting ordinance, giving coins speci￿c values in terms of ￿ orins. Such ef-
forts were generally ine⁄ective, however, as they provided a strong incentive
for local mints to further debase their coinage as a source of revenue. Mer-
chants trading had an incentive to hold debased money, as doing so would
5have allowed them to discharge their trading debts with less precious metal,
and to pocket some of the di⁄erence between what was required to settle
their original obligation (as measured in precious metal) and what was paid
back. Or, if a debt was payable through a cashier (as was typically the
case), the cashier might ￿cherry-pick￿ the heavier coins and pay out the
debased ones. Adam Smith ([1776] 1994, 511) summarized the di¢ culty of
the situation:
Before 1609 the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin,
which the extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of
Europe, reduced the value of its currency about 9 per cent below
that of good money fresh from the mint. ... The merchants, with
plenty of currency, could not always ￿nd a su¢ cient quantity of
good money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those
bills, in spite of several regulations which were made to prevent
it, became in a great measure uncertain.
The marketplace was willing to tolerate small di⁄erences in the weight
of coins. Van Dillen (1934, 88) notes that the minting ordinance of 1638
valued both the cross rixdollar (minted in the Spanish Netherlands) and the
rixdollar (minted in the Republic) at 2.5 ￿ orins, ￿though the former was of
much higher degree of ￿neness than the latter.￿Often, however, an increase
in the circulation of a lighter coin was fatal for a heavier one.
The short-term losers in a debasement were no doubt those who held
bills of exchange payable in ￿ orins. As Adam Smith pointed out, how-
ever, the eventual losers were the Dutch merchants themselves, as creditors
demanded higher and higher exchange rates on bills, in order to protect
themselves from loss of purchasing power via debasements. The natural
response to this situation on the part of the Republic was to revise its mint-
ing ordinances, bringing the o¢ cial valuations of coins in line with market
valuations. However, quite often by the time the minting ordinance was
changed, all heavy coins had vanished from circulation, to be replaced by
light coins. Minting ordinances were passed in 1586, 1608, 1622, 1638, and
1659, with various revisions taking place at dates in between (Van Dillen,
1934, Korthals Altes 2001). The frequency with which these ordinances were
passed was a testament to their ine⁄ectiveness.10
Figure 1 presents time series on the silver content of the ￿ orin/guilder, as
estimated by various monetary historians, and an index of nominal consumer
10The 1659 ordinance did however contribute to monetary stabilization by legally recog-
nizing the di⁄erence between the banco and current ￿ orins (discussed below). See van
Dillen (1934, 89).
6prices.11 The data are for the northern Netherlands from 1500 to 1800. Both
prices and the silver content of the ￿ orin are relatively stable until around
1550. From the mid-sixteenth century until the founding of the Bank of
Amsterdam (1609), the silver content of the ￿ orin falls by about one percent
per year on average, while annual in￿ ation averages about two percent (see
Table 1 below).
Not all of the in￿ ation seems attributable to debasement. The ￿silver
equivalent￿price (the nominal price times the silver content of the ￿ orin)
increased on average by one percent annually during this period. This in-
crease most likely re￿ ects the increased availability of silver from the New
World, as well the strengthening economy of the Republic.
Table 1: Average changes in money and prices
in the northern Netherlands, 1500-1800
Average annual Average annual Average annual %￿
Period %￿ CPI %￿ in silver content in silver equivalent
= (1) of ￿ orin = (2) price ￿ (1)+(2)
1500-1549 1.2 0.0 1.2
1550-1608 2.0 -1.0 1.0
1609-1658 0.9 -0.2 0.7
1659-1779 0.1 0.0 0.1
1780-1800 0.6 0.0 0.0
Source: Van Zanden (2004)
Two percent annual in￿ ation seems relatively innocuous by modern stan-
dards, but this rate of in￿ ation, and the coincident phenomenon of debase-
ment was nonetheless strongly condemned by contemporary observers. One
reason for this dissatisfaction must have been the ￿lumpiness￿ of debase-
ments: a coin might be stable temporarily but suddenly lose ten percent of
its metallic content. Below, we explore another potential source of dissat-
isfaction, which is the ￿double-edged￿nature of in￿ ation that arises under
a commodity standard. That is, a debasement imposes costs not only on
current creditors but also on participants in future credit transactions.
11The price series is from Van Zanden (2004) and has been smoothed to reduce short-
term variation. Estimates of the silver content of the ￿ orin are from Van Zanden, Posthu-
mus (1948), and Korthals Altes (2001). Each ￿ orin series re￿ ects the researcher￿ s judge-
ment as to the composition and market value of the coinage circulating at the time.
72.2 An exchange bank as the (accidental) solution
The ongoing erosion in the value of the Dutch currency led the governing
council of Amsterdam to establish the Wisselbank in 1609. As emphasized
by van Dillen (1934), the purpose of the founders was not to allow for the
creation of any sort of central bank money, but simply to better enforce the
minting ordinances. To this end, the ordinance establishing the Wisselbank
put into place a number of new legal restrictions, including most importantly,
1. A requirement that all bills of exchange of 600 ￿ orins and upwards
were to be payable at the Wisselbank;
2. A restriction that only lawful coins could be deposited into accounts
at the Wisselbank; unlawful coins as well as bullion could be brought
in to the bank, but these were to be turned over to the local mint,
and the depositor credited only for the value of their precious metal
(minus the customary charge for seigniorage);
3. A restriction that the Wisselbank was bound to observe the valuations
of coins as stated in the minting ordinance. (However the Wisselbank
was allowed to charge a minimal withdrawal fee for certain coins.)
Together these restrictions were designed to ensure that bills were not
paid in debased coin, or in cashier accounts de facto only payable in debased
coin. Re￿ ecting its purely ￿monetary￿mission, the Wisselbank did not grant
any sort of credits, but simply held the deposited coin in its vaults. Thus,
a stylized balance sheet for the Wisselbank during this period would have
looked like the following:12
Table 2: Stylized early balance sheet of the Wisselbank
Assets Liabilities
￿Lawful￿coin, Balances held as deposits
(e.g., rixdollars)
￿Unlawful￿coin and bullion
(to be minted into lawful coin)
During the ￿rst ￿fty years of its existence, the Wisselbank enjoyed some
degree of success. Since Wisselbank funds were payable in coins with a rel-
atively stable value, the pace of debasements slowed to a trickle as more
and more transactions were settled in bank funds. The Wisselbank was not
12Some selected actual balance sheets are presented in Appendix C.
8entirely successful, however, in its goal of ￿demonetizing￿the lighter foreign
coins, which continued to circulate. Figure 1 shows that prices continued
to rise throughout the ￿rst half of the 17th century, albeit at a lower rate
than before (averaging less than one percent annually from Table 1). Table
3 shows that the value of ￿ orin against the English pound at ￿rst stabi-
lized during this period, but gradually began to erode as heavier coins were
withdrawn from the bank and were replaced by lighter coin.
Table 3: Amsterdam on London Exchange Rate










Source: Simon Hart￿ s Five Year Averages in McCusker (1978, 55)
Throughout this period, the price of a given coin at the Wisselbank
was still set by ordinance, often at a value below the actual market value
of the coin as measured in ￿ orins. For example, a cross rixdollar at the
Wisselbank was valued at 2.4 ￿ orins while a cross rixdollar outside of the
Wisselbank was 2.5 ￿ orins (van Dillen 1934, 89-90). As a consequence,
there arose two separate units of account, the current ￿ orin and the banco
￿ orin. Bills of exchange and other important ￿nancial transactions were
settled in Wisselbank money and so were priced in banco ￿ orins, while spot
transactions and accounts at cashiers were priced in current ￿ orins.
A market began to develop where people transferred ownership of banco
deposits in exchange for current coins. Direct exchange avoided the Wis-
selbank￿ s small withdrawal fee, and the exchange rate between the two was
measured by the premium on bank money, known as the agio. The distinc-
tion between the two prevalent units of account was o¢ cially recognized in
1659. Table 4 summarizes the resulting changes in the monetary system of
the Dutch Republic.
9Table 4: Money of the Dutch Republic
Pre-Wisselbank Post-Wisselbank
Circa 1600 Circa 1650
Unit of account: Florin Current Florin Banco Florin
Coin: Domestic coins Light Heavy
Foreign coins coins coins
Exchange bank Wisselbank
money: accounts
Inside Cashiers￿accounts Cashiers￿ Bills of
money: Bills of exchange accounts exchange
The success of the exchange market (in coin for bank money) meant
that coins were rarely withdrawn from the Wisselbank for domestic pur-
poses. The next evolutionary step was the end of the right of withdrawal
of Wisselbank deposits, which occurred sometime during the second half of
the 17th century. The exact date is unknown, and the lack of contemporary
commentary suggests how inconsequential the change seemed to individual
customers. From a modern perspective, however, the change meant that
Wisselbank deposits became in a⁄ect an outside money because the bank
faced no o⁄setting liability. The agio became in turn an exchange rate be-
tween coin and outside money. By transforming its deposits into outside
money, the Wisselbank was able to more e⁄ectively discourage debasements
and their in￿ ationary consequences. Any drop in the silver content of cur-
rent money could be o⁄set by an increase in the value of the agio. Merchants
needing to repay debts denominated in banco ￿ orins would have no incentive
to hold debased coins, as these would o⁄er little advantage in the purchase
of Wisselbank funds.
A ￿nal evolutionary step in the development of the Wisselbank was the
introduction of a system of receipts in 1683. A merchant could deposit
bullion or coin at the Wisselbank and receive in return an advance of bank
funds and a receipt. The receipt would entitle its holder a return of the
bullion or coin, provided that the receipt holder returned the funds advanced,
plus a very small amount of interest (e.g., one-quarter percent interest every
six months for silver coin). A stylized balance sheet of the Wisselbank during
its later period would look like the following:




Light coin or ￿current money,￿ (i.e., options to purchase coins
discounted at the agio or bullion at a ￿xed price)
(￿ ￿Option value￿of
receipts)
As described by Adam Smith ([1776], 1994, 513-518), receipts would
commonly circulate as form of quasi-money. Receipts and bank balances
were complementary instruments. Receipts could circulate outside the Wis-
selbank and be redeemed for coin or bullion, while bank balances could
not. Bank balances could be used to settle bills of exchange while receipts
could not. Receipts and balances were freely traded in an open market, and
by trading in this market, the Wisselbank was able to maintain complete
control of the value of the bank ￿ orin.13
Figure 1 attests to the e¢ cacy of these arrangements. By about 1650,
the silver content of Dutch coins became remarkably stable, and the Dutch
price level (CPI indexed to ￿ orin prices) ￿ uctuated in a stationary way over
the next century.14 The goal of encouraging commercial credit was achieved.
In the words of van Dillen (1925), Amsterdam became, ￿the place were very
nearly all the bills payable within Europe are drawn, remitted or otherwise
discounted and traded (translated by de Vries and van der Woude 1997,
136).￿
3 Model
This section presents a model of the monetary environment of the early-
17th century Dutch republic, both before and after the institution of the
Wisselbank. The model is adapted from Freeman (1996).15
13The open market operations of the Wisselbank in this sense resembled those of a mod-
ern day currency board. A key di⁄erence was that a ￿spot￿trade of metal for Wisselbank
funds was always accompanied by the issue of a put option on Wisselbank funds, i.e., a
receipt.
14The only change in silver coinage between 1659 and 1839 was the introduction of the
guilder in 1681 (Posthumus 1946, cviii).
15The Freeman model provides a useful vehicle for our analysis, because it allows for
payment in both inside and outside money, and requires settlement of inside money trans-
actions in outside money. This model has been employed extensively in the analysis of
payment systems; see Zhou (2000) for a partial survey. Fujiki (2003) and Hernandez-
11There are three types of agents in the initial model: debtors, creditors,
and cashiers. The cashiers are replaced with an exchange bank in a second
version of the model.
Debtors and creditors exist as overlapping generations of two-period lived
agents. Each generation is divided into an equal number of debtors and
creditors, who are distributed over a number of ￿islands.￿Debtors are born
on debtor islands and creditors are born on creditor islands, and agents
are distributed over islands in a symmetric way. Debtors (creditors) are
endowed when young with a quantity x (y) of a perishable good unique
to their respective islands. There is also a central island where debts are
discharged. The life histories of creditors and debtors are as follows.
Generation-t debtors wish to consume their own endowment good and
the good of a creditor island in period t. To do this, young debtors journey to
creditor islands to purchase goods from young creditors in period t, issuing
debt (drawing bills) payable on the books of a cashier at the central island
in period t + 1 in order to make these purchases.16 They then sell some
of their endowment good to old creditors in return for coin. These coins
may then be subsequently deposited on the books of a cashier in order to
discharge the obligation created by the drawing of the bill earlier in the
period. Preferences are such that there are no double coincidences of wants:
the goods of debtor island j are desired by residents of a particular creditor
island k, but residents of island j are only interested in consuming goods of
some other creditor island. Also, old debtors leave the central island before
the arrival of the old creditors, meaning that settlement of a bill requires
the services of an intermediary, i.e., a cashier.
Generation-t debtors may also consume debtor goods of any type in pe-
riod t + 1. Second-period consumption is less satisfying, however, and con-
suming a debtor good at t+1 only generates utility equivalent to consuming
a (small) fraction ￿ of consuming a debtor good at t.
Formally, the representative debtor￿ s preferences are given by
V (dxt + ￿d0
x;t+1;dyt) (1)
where dxt indicates the debtor￿ s consumption of his endowment good in
period t, d0
x;t+1 denotes consumption of a debtor good in period t + 1, and
dyt denotes the debtor￿ s period-t consumption of the relevant creditor good.
Verme (forthcoming) have used the Freeman model to analyze economies operating under
metallic standards.
16Following Freeman (1996), we assume there exists an enforcement technology which
guarantees that all debts will be repaid.
12Generation-t creditors wish to consume some of their own endowment
good in period t, and the goods of some debtor island in period t+1. To do
this, the generation-t creditors sell some of their endowment to generation-t
debtors in exchange for a bill payable at t+1, on the books of a cashier the
central island. At time t + 1, old creditors receive payments from cashiers
where the old debtors have deposited their coin. The old creditors withdraw
this coin and then journey to debtor islands in order to buy the debtor goods
they desire from young debtors.
The representative creditor￿ s utility is given by
U(cx;t+1;cyt) (2)
where cyt indicates the creditor￿ s consumption of his endowment good in pe-
riod t, and cx;t+1 denotes the creditor￿ s period-t consumption of the relevant
debtor good. Both U and V are assumed to be twice continuously di⁄er-
entiable, additively separable, and to be increasing and concave in each
argument, with indi⁄erence curves that do not cross the axes.
Cashiers are single-period lived indivuals who reside on the central is-
land. Cashiers value both types of goods and have utility given by
￿xt + ￿yt (3)
where ￿xt and ￿yt denote the representative cashier￿ s time-t consumption of
debtor and creditor goods, respectively.
Cashiers have no endowment of goods, but are endowed with a ￿banking
technology￿that allows them to take in deposits of coin, settle obligations by
transfer of accounts, and to allow for withdrawals in coin. Before describing
the cashiers in more detail, we must ￿rst introduce some additional structure
in the model, with three key restrictions.
Currency area and restrictions on prices. The islands in the model com-
prise a ￿currency area￿(the ￿Low Countries￿ ) with a common unit of ac-
count (￿the ￿ orin￿ ). Prices within the Low Countries must be stated in this
unit of account, and cashiers￿accounts must be kept in this unit of account.
Use of debt and coins in transactions. Debts issued by young debtors
must be denominated in the Low Countries￿unit of account (￿ orin) and are
payable on the books of a cashier. Coins deposited with cashiers must be
recognized in a minting ordinance (to be described below) but are valued
at their market value. Old creditors￿purchases of young debtors￿goods are
also made with coin. These coins are obtained by withdrawals from cashiers￿
accounts. The initial old creditors are endowed with stocks of at least one
13coin.17
Mints and minting ordinances. Coins are produced by mints and a mint-
ing ordinance assigns each coin a value in terms of the native unit of account.
Each coin has a ￿xed amount of a durable precious metal, ￿silver.￿ 18 At least
one mint (and possibly more) is accessible from the islands in the model,
including the central island (￿Amsterdam￿ ). Each mint freely converts sil-
ver (including coins of other mints) into coin, extracting a fraction of the
silver in the process. In terms of notation, let I be the set of coins covered
in the minting ordinance, and let Ct ￿ I be the set of coins circulating at
the beginning of period t. Each coin i 2 I has a silver content of bi ounces,
and the minting ordinance assigns it a value of ei ￿ orins. Consistent with
historical practice, we do not require that all coins circulate at their legal
values. Instead, the time t market ￿ orin value eit of coin i may exceed but
cannot fall below its legal value, i.e., eit ￿ ei.19 The ￿weight￿of a coin is
given by the ounces of silver it contains for each ￿ orin of nominal value, i.e.,
the weight of coin i is bi=ei.
Each coin is produced by a separate mint and coin i is subject to a
seigniorage charge of ￿i, expressed as a fraction of the face value of the
coin. Any silver obtained from seigniorage is ￿thrown in the ocean,￿i.e.,
disposed of by the government collecting the revenue and not redistributed
among agents in the economy.20 This is defensible given that, historically,
seignorage revenues were often used for the hiring of foreign mercenaries
and the importation of war materiel. In order to focus on purely monetary
aspects of the 17th century Low Countries economy, our analysis also ignores
the budget constraints of the governments operating the mints. In practice,
the stabilization of ￿scal policy (by the Dutch Republic) was a precondition
17Note that this restriction rules out the use of uncoined precious metal as money, as
occurs in Sargent and Wallace (1983). This is a defensible restriction given that, at the
time of the founding of the Wisselbank, commercial obligations were most often settled
using cashiers￿accounts (payable in coin, but denominated in ￿ orins) rather than in coin
itself.
18Both silver and gold coins were used in the Low Countries during the period considered
in this paper, but silver became the de facto standard by the mid-17th century. An
extension of the model to two precious metals is possible but beyond the scope of the
present study.
19That is, a creditor owed a debt of D ￿ orins may not compel a debtor to pay more
than D=ei coins of type i in order to settle the debt. However a creditor may be willing
to settle for fewer coins if a particular coin is ￿overvalued￿relative to its legal value. As
noted above such ￿overvaluation￿was quite common at the time of the founding of the
Wisselbank.
20We also ignore the distinction between ￿gross￿ and ￿net￿ seigniorage. In practice,
seigniorage charges had to be large enough to cover minting costs or ￿brassage.￿
14for the monetary stabilization achieved by the Wisselbank; see for example,
de Vries and van der Woude (1997).
To model a 17th-century monetary environment, it is also necessary to
acknowledge the ￿commodity￿nature of contemporary coinage. Following
Sargent and Smith (1997) and Sargent and Velde (2002), this is accomplished
via a ￿world market,￿that is willing to substitute arbitrarily large amounts
of silver for goods at constant ￿world prices￿of ￿ ounces of silver per debtor
good and ! ounces of silver per creditor good.21 Buying or selling a good on
the world market incurs a proportional transaction or ￿iceberg￿cost equal
to the fraction ￿. For example, an agent purchasing a debtor good on the
world market must pay ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ounces of silver, while an agent selling a
debtor good receives only ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ounces of silver.
At certain stages during a period, debtors and creditors have access to
world markets for their own type of good. That is, debtors may always
freely exchange silver for their own type of debtor good, and creditors may
exchange silver for their respective creditor goods. There is also an opportu-
nity in each period for agents to use silver (coined or uncoined) to purchase
their desired consumption goods on the world market.
The cashiers on the central islands o⁄er their settlement services to ar-
riving old debtors. That is, their banking technology allows cashiers to take
in, transfer, and pay out deposits. All coins are valued at market values,
subject to the restrictions in the minting ordinance. Any pro￿ts realized by
the cashiers takes the form of deposited coins that the cashiers need not pay
out, and the cashiers can use such coins to obtain consumption goods on
the world market. However, the cashiers are su¢ ciently numerous so as to
be perfectly competitive and earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium.22
The timing of agents￿actions within a period is given in Table 5 below. In
the table, the abbreviations YD, YC, OD, and OC are used for young/old
debtor/creditors. Goods are abbrieviated as debtor goods (DG), creditor
goods (CG), and silver (S). Locations are given by the debtor islands (DI),
creditor islands (CI), the world market (WM), and the central island (A).
An asterisk indicates that an action is not feasible for a particular group of
agents at that particular stage.
21I.e., the Low Countries comprise a ￿small open economy￿with respect to the world
silver market.
22For notational convenience we set the number of cashiers to exactly equal the number
of debtors (or creditors).
15Table 6: Timing of actions within a period
Stage YD￿ s YC￿ s OD￿ s OC￿ s Cashiers
Can trade Can trade Can trade S
1. DG for S or CG for S * for DG *
CG (WM) (on WM) (on WM)
Can mint
2. * S into * * *
coin
Deposit Credit OD￿ s
3. * * coin with * for coin
cashier (A) deposited
Present Pay bills
4. * * * bills, paid presented
in coin (A) by OC￿ s
Can melt
5. * * * coin, buy *
CG (WM)
Buy CG￿ s Sell CG If has CG
6. with bills to YDs * can sell *
(on CI￿ s) for bills to YD￿ s
(on CI￿ s) (on CI￿ s)
Sell DG￿ s Buy DG If holds
7. to OC￿ s * * from YD￿ s coin, can
for coin (on DI￿ s) buy goods
(on DI￿ s) (on WM)
Can mint,




Note that for old creditors to bene￿t from the purchase of creditor goods
abroad and subsequent domestic resale of these goods, we must allow for the
possibility that old creditors will transfer the bills they receive in payment
from young creditors. Likewise, a young debtor receiving a bill of another
young debtor as payment (from an old creditor who has imported creditor
goods), must be allowed to negotiate or ￿deposit￿the bill with a cashier in
the following period. This is a reasonable requirement given that, as dis-
16cussed above, such negotiability was a commonplace feature of 17th century
￿nancial obligations.
The existence of the world markets imposes certain restrictions on prices.
In particular, let p
j
xt be the ￿ orin price of debtor goods on debtor island j.
Then absence of arbitrage implies that for all i 2 I





(cf. Sargent and Velde 2002, 27). If condition (4) were violated, then agents
could make riskless pro￿ts by minting coin i, buying up debtor goods on
island j and selling the goods on the world market; prices would therefore






bi (1 ￿ ￿)
(5)
If condition (5) were violated, then agents could earn arbitrage pro￿ts by
selling goods locally for coin i, then melting the coins to buy more goods on
the world market. Following Sargent and Velde (2002), we will refer to the
bounds in (4) and (5) as ￿minting￿and ￿melting￿points for coin i.
If more than one type of coin is in circulation, agents have the option
of melting one type of coin and having it minted into another type. The
process of melting and reminting is subject to the same transactions costs as
other ￿external￿transactions.23 This possibility gives rise to the following
constraints which must hold for all pairs of coins where fi;cg where i 2 I
and c 2 Ct






which in fact are implied by the constraints (4) and (5). If condition (6)
were violated, then coin c would be undervalued relative to coin i, causing
agents to melt coin c and mint coin i. The bounds de￿ned by (6) correspond
to the ￿gold points￿of the classical gold standard.
Similar constraints will apply to the price of creditor goods. Let Pk
yt
be the time-t creditor-island price of creditor goods on island k, payable in
￿ orins at the central island at time t + 1. Then the following must hold for
all coins i 2 I




23In practice, di⁄erent magnitudes of transactions costs applied to di⁄erent types of
transactions. In this stylized account we assume these are the same in order to keep the
notational burden of the model at a manageable level.




bi (1 ￿ ￿)
(8)
Conditions (7) and (8) de￿ne additional minting and melting points for each
coin.
For the special case where ￿ = ! = 1 and ￿ = 0, the lower bounds in (4)
and (7) are known as mint prices. Likewise, for the same special case the
upper bounds in (5) and (8) are known as mint equivalents.24 These quan-
tities represent the theoretical values at which a mint producing a certain
coin would buy or sell silver, respectively.
Conditions (4)-(8) together imply bounds on the relative price of debtor
versus creditor goods, i.e.,
￿(1 ￿ ￿)












! (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿i)
(9)
for all circulating coins i. The fact that agents can both buy and sell goods















! (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (10)
It will be convenient to de￿ne the set Fi(e) as the set of prices (px;Py) for
which (4), (5), (7), (8), and (10) are satis￿ed for coin i in steady state when
market valuations of coins are given by e.
The money supply in the Low Countries will depend on the ￿ orin values
of the various coins, their initial stocks, and the amount of minting and
melting of the various coins that occurs within a period. The Low Coun-






where mit is the stock of coin i at the beginning of t. Money evolves accord-
ing to
Mt+1 = Mt +
X
i2I
eit (￿it + nit) ￿
X
i2Ct
eit (￿it + ￿it) (12)
where nit;￿it ￿ 0 represents the number of coins of type i minted by debtors
and creditors, respectively, during period t, and ￿it;￿it 2 [0;mit] represents
24The terms mint price and mint equivalent are due to Redish (1990).
18the number of coins of type i melted by debtors and creditors respectively,
in period t.
3.1 Golden-rule allocation
It will be useful to consider a benchmark steady-state allocation in our
analysis of this model. Ordinarily one considers Pareto optimal allocations,
and equilibria that support such allocations. In the case of commodity
money, however, monetary equilibria are known to be ine¢ cient (see e.g.,
Sargent and Wallace 1983), meaning that we must restrict our attention to
second-best allocations.
Following Freeman (1996), we focus solely on the golden-rule steady-
state allocation that solves the Pareto problem, assigning equal weights to







U(cx;cy) + V (dx + ￿d0
x;dy) (13)
subject to non-negativity constraints on consumptions cx;cy;dx;d0
x;dy, non-
negativity constraints on exports xe (ye) of debtor (creditor) goods to the
world market, and the resource constraints
cx + dx + d0










Given our assumptions about U and V , it is straightforward to show that
there is a unique solution to this problem, characterized by conditions (14)
and (15) at equality, d0












! (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (16)
where the ￿rst inequality binds if xe > 0 and the second inequality binds if
ye > 0. Condition (16) equates marginal rates of substitution across debtors
and creditors, and requires both of these be not too far from the ￿world￿
marginal rate of transformation ￿=!, net of transactions costs.
Below we will consider implementation of this allocation under various
monetary arrangements.
25We also keep the utility of the cashiers at their reservation level, i.e., zero. At the cost
of more notational complexity, we could apply the same approach to more general classes
of second-best allocations.
193.2 Steady-state monetary equilibria
We now analyze monetary equilibria in the model, where creditor goods
are purchased with bills, bills are discharged by transfer of deposits with
cashiers, and debtor goods are purchased with coin. We restrict our atten-
tion to steady-state equilibria (and temporary deviations therefrom) that
are symmetric across islands.




V (dxt + ￿d0
x;t+1;dyt) (17)
where zd
t denotes the export of the debtor￿ s endowment good for purpose
of obtaining silver to buy creditor goods on the world market, and ht is
the nominal quantity of bills issued by the debtor in Stage 6 of period t.
The debtor is subject to nonnegativity constraints on exports, consumption,
melting, and minting, a cap on melting given by the stock of each circulating
coin, and the following constraints (where by symmetry we have dropped




































where Mt denotes money brought by creditors to debtor islands in Stage
7 of period t. Constraint (18) is a budget constraint and states that the
amount of money that a young debtor receives in the ￿rst period of life
cannot exceed the value of his net supply of debtor goods to Low Countries
markets (as opposed to the world market). The latter is given by the value
of his endowment, minus his consumption, minus the quantity of the good
exchanged to obtain silver for coinage, minus the amount of the good ex-
ported to obtain his desired creditor good on the world market, plus any
quantity of the good obtained by melting coin and purchasing the good on
the world market. Constraint (19) is a ￿settlement constraint￿and states
that coin is necessary to redeem debt issued to purchase creditor goods, or
to purchase debtor goods in the second period of life. Finally, constraint
20(20) requires that the debtor issue bills to cover any period-t purchases of
creditor goods made in Low Countries.
First-order conditions for this problem reduce to the following set of
conditions. First,













for i 2 Ct where (22) holds with equality for i such that ￿it > 0. Since
debtors always have the option of purchasing some of their desired creditor








with equality if zd







with equality for d0
x;t+1 > 0.




t denotes exports for purchasing
debtor goods on the world markets, and ‘t+1 denotes the ￿ orin value of bills
held by the creditor at time-t + 1. The creditor is subject to nonnegativity









































Constraint (26) says that ‘t+1 cannot exceed the t + 1 value of goods sold
by the creditor (either in period t or in period t + 1 through importation).
Constraint (27) says that the value of the debtor goods purchased by the
debtor in the Low Countries cannot exceed the value of bills due the creditor,
plus net coinage on the part of the creditor. For constant ￿ orin values e,
￿rst-order conditions reduce to
￿











ei;t+1! (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿)
(28)
where the ￿rst inequality binds if (circulating) coin i is melted, and the





!(1 ￿ ￿)2 (29)
with equality if zc
t > 0.
Operating under a zero-pro￿t constraint, cashiers face a trivial opti-
mization problem, i.e., there is only one course of action open to them. This
consists of accepting deposits from creditors in Stage 3 of each period, trans-
ferring balances and paying them out to depositors in Stage 4. Note that at
the end of Stage 3 of period t, the typical banker has liabilities of ‘t ￿ orins
in the form of deposits that must cover bills to be presented in Stage 4 by









in the form of deposits of generation t ￿ 1 debtors. In equilibrium, these
amounts must clearly be the same, and the coins deposited by the debtors
will be the coins received by the creditors.
A steady-state monetary equilibrium can now be de￿ned as a time invari-
ant collection of the following: a vector of consumptions (cx;cy;dx;d0
x;dy),
a vector of exports (zc;zd), a set of prices (px;Py), a set of ￿ orin values
e ￿ e for all coins in I, a set of circulating coins C ￿ I, a vector of stocks
22of circulating coins mc, and a set of minting-and melting vectors fn;￿;￿;￿g
such that creditors￿and debtors￿￿rst-order conditions as well as budget
and settlement constraints are satis￿ed, markets clear, conditions (5) and
(8) hold for all i 2 C, conditions (4) and (7) hold for i 2 I, cashiers￿balance
sheets balance, and condition (10) holds. In such an equilibrium the total
stock of money M is constant.
So de￿ned, the set of steady-state monetary equilibria is potentially quite
large. The principal di¢ culty is that there is no way to uniquely determine
the value of a ￿￿ orin.￿Again we appeal to historical experience and consider
a subset of equilibria that satisfy the following restriction:
Condition 1 Let g 2 I be a coin with the greatest minting point according
to the values assigned in the minting ordinance, i.e., a coin for which
eg (1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿)
bg
￿
ei (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿)
bi
(31)
for all i 2 I. Then the market value of coin g equals its legal value, i.e.,
eg = eg.
This restriction is motivated by the following considerations. We inter-
pret the minting ordinances as giving a creditor the option of demanding
payment in some lawful coin at its lawfully speci￿ed value. In other words,
not all coins may be simultaneously overvalued, so that the market value of
at least one coin must equal its legal value. Condition 1 speci￿es that this is
the coin that provides a debtor with the greatest number of ￿ orins per ounce
of precious metal minted. This would be the least costly means by which a
debtor (or cashier) could hold to the letter of the minting ordinance, should
a creditor make this demand.
The following result establishes that under mild conditions, the golden-
rule allocation can be implemented as a steady-state monetary equilibrium.
The key requirement is that the seigniorage rate ￿g for the coin g be su¢ -
ciently large relative to the iceberg cost ￿.
Proposition 2 Let g 2 I be a coin with the greatest minting point according
to the values assigned in the minting ordinance. If (1 ￿ ￿g) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2 and
￿ > 0 is su¢ ciently small, then the golden-rule allocation can be supported
as a steady-state monetary equilibrium satisfying condition 1, in which only
coin g circulates.
Proof. See Appendix A.
23Corollary 3 If in addition, there are other coins i 2 I for which (1 ￿
￿i) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2, then the golden-rule allocation can be supported as a steady-
state monetary equilibrium satisfying condition 1, in which all such coins
circulate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind the proofs of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 is illus-
trated in Figure 2. Feasible sets of prices Fg for coin g and Fi for another coin
i are depicted. The golden-rule allocation requires that equilibrium prices lie
along the line (Px=Py) = MRS￿, where MRS￿ is the golden-rule marginal
rate of substitution across debtor and creditor goods. If (1￿￿g) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2,
then Fg will always be large enough to contain one such pair of equilibrium
prices, e.g., (P￿
x;P￿
y) in the ￿gure. If this point is contained in Fi \Fg, then
both coins can circulate. If not, we can shift Fi to the northeast by raising
coin i￿ s market value above its minting-ordinance value. Then as long as
(1 ￿ ￿i) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2, i.e., if su¢ cient seignorage is charged by the respective
mints, then Fi \ Fg will be large enough to contain such a point.
The available evidence suggests that signi￿cant amounts of seignorage
were charged by contemporary mints, in accordance with the requirements of
the Proposition and Corollary. Polak (1998) calculates the mint prices and
mint equivalents for many coins issued in the Dutch Republic. For example,
Polak calculates the following values for 1606, based on minting-ordinance
￿ orin values for each coin.
Table 7: Mint prices and mint equivalents
of selected coins, 1606
Coin Mint price Mint equivalent Seignorage (%)
Rixdollar 22.150 22.498 1.5
Lion dollar 22.200 22.519 1.4
10-Stuiver coin 22.325 22.545 1.0
Units are ￿ orins per mark (= 8 troy ounces)
Finally, we note that if there is more than one circulating coin, the equi-
librium in Corollary 3 displays Sargent and Smith￿ s (1997) ￿anti-Gresham￿ s
Law￿property, i.e., that the relative values of the circulating coins are not
uniquely determined by their precious metal content. This feature of the
model is consistent with the monetary situation prevalent at the time of the
founding of the Wisselbank.
244 Modeling a debasement
Corollary 3 illustrates how a stable-price equilibrium is a feasible outcome
under a commodity money regime with multiple mints. Prior to the founding
of the Wisselbank, however, the Dutch economy su⁄ered from in￿ ation, due
to a succession of debasements in its stocks of coin. We now provide some
examples of how a debasement might work in the context of the model. For
simplicity we consider the e⁄ects of a one-time unanticipated debasement,
followed by a return to steady state after a single period of adjustment.26
We ￿rst consider a hypothetical special case where there is only one
mint and there is only one Low Countries coin in circulation (call this the
rixdollar). Without loss of generality this coin is assigned a ￿ orin value
of e = 1. Up until time t, the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium
that supports a golden-rule allocation which does not require the export of
either debtor or creditor goods. The steady-state money stock (=stock of
rixdollars) is given by M = m, the steady-state ￿ orin price of debtor goods
is p￿
x and bills of exchange drawn by young debtors to purchase creditor
goods are worth P￿
y ￿ orins the following period. Rixdollars contain b ounces
of silver and are freely minted at a seigniorage charge of ￿.
At the beginning of period t, the mint announces a debasement of the
rixdollar. A debasement is de￿ned as a choice of new silver content b0 < b and
a new seigniorage charge ￿0, where the mint is willing to freely mint silver,
including old ￿heavy￿rixdollars, into new ￿light￿rixdollars at a seigniorage
charge of ￿0. To be successful, a debasement must induce old debtors to
turn in their old rixdollars for reminting.27 Debtors will do this if they are
left with more rixdollars after reminting than before, i.e., if28
^ m ￿
mb(1 ￿ ￿0)
b0 ￿ m (32)
(cf. Sussman and Zeira 2003, 1779) where ^ m is the number of coins after
reminting, which is equivalent to requiring that the minting point of the new
26We study these ￿adjustment periods￿as convenient proxies for the intervals of tran-
sition following a debasement.
27We will assume that old debtors always have access to mints immediately following
such announcements.
28Note that the transaction cost ￿ does not arise when a coin is reminted into a coin of
the same type. Also note under the overlapping generations structure, old debtors always
prefer to remint under condition (32), since they cannot consume after their second period
of life. In practice, debasements sometimes led to the di⁄erentiation of a single coin into
two distinct coins, i.e., the ￿new￿(debased) and ￿old￿(nondebased) coin. See Rolnick,
Velde, and Weber (1996) for some medieval examples.






It is immediately apparent from (32) and (33) that an unanticipated
debasement can increase the money stock and shift no-arbitrage conditions
(4), (5), (7), and (8). What is perhaps less apparent that an unanticipated
debasement can lead to an increase in demand for the debased coin. To see
this, consider the no-arbitrage conditions following a debasement
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 ￿ px ￿
￿
b0 (1 ￿ ￿)
(34)
! (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 ￿ Py ￿
!
b0 (1 ￿ ￿)
(35)
Clearly the ￿rst inequalities in conditions (34) and (35) will be violated
for pre-debasement prices (px;Py) = (p￿
x;P￿
y), for a su¢ ciently large debase-
ment (su¢ ciently small but positive b0). In other words, if the domestic
￿silver equivalent￿price of either debtor (or creditor) goods becomes cheap
enough, debtors (or creditors) will be tempted to export their endowment
goods and buy their desired consumption good domestically. To make these
purchases, they need to convert the silver they earn by exporting their en-
dowment to domestic coinage, resulting in an increased demand for the
debased coin and ultimately, an increase in prices of both types of good.
More formally, we have the following results.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the one-coin economy is in a steady-state monetary
equilibrium that supports the golden-rule allocation, which does not require
the export of debtor or creditor goods. Then for a su¢ ciently large unantici-
pated debasement (su¢ ciently small b0 > 0), the original equilibrium cannot
hold.
Proof. As noted above, a su¢ ciently small b0 causes the ￿rst inequalities
in (34) and (35) to be violated.
Proposition 5 In the one-coin economy, if such a debasement occurs where
￿0 = ￿ and endowments are su¢ ciently large, then: (i) The economy can
return to a new steady-state monetary equilibrium after a one-period tran-
sition, where the equilibrium allocation again corresponds to the golden-rule
allocation. (ii) In the new equilibrium, both prices and the nominal money
26stock are (weakly) higher than in the original equilibrium. (iii) The transi-
tion to the new equilibrium will sometimes require the export of goods and
additional minting of the debased coin.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 illustrates a paradoxical feature of commodity-money sys-
tems, that a debasement can actually lead to a surge in minting of the
debased coin.29 This can occur because a debasement not only increases
the nominal money stock but also exerts upward pressure on prices through
no-arbitrage conditions (34) and (35). To maintain a constant real money
stock, additional coinage is sometimes required.
Figure 3 illustrates the intuition behind the proof of Proposition 5. An
unanticipated debasement in the single-coin economy shifts the set of feasible
prices northeastwards, from F to F0. If this shift is small enough, prices can
immediately shift from their original equilibrium values (point E) to a new
point E0 in the interior of F0. For a severe debasement, however, E0 may not
be an equilibrium because agents are left with insu¢ cient coin following a
debasement. In such cases, prices in the new equilibrium will correspond to
a point such as E00, where at least one type of agent (in Figure 3, debtors)
has an incentive to mint additional coins.
Proposition 5 also allows us to characterize the deleterious e⁄ects of an
unanticipated debasement. Such a debasement imposes two types of costs
on an economy. The ￿rst type of cost is comparable to the cost associated
with unanticipated ￿at money in￿ ation, i.e., a transfer of wealth from credi-
tors holding nominal obligations to the debtors whose obligations they hold,
which leads to ine¢ cient allocations of goods in the period where the in￿ a-
tionary shock occurs. A su¢ ciently large debasement will also give rise to a
second type of cost, which is the value of consumption foregone as goods are
exported in order to expand the real stock of money to its pre-debasement
level.
This second type of cost is nothing more than an illustration of the well-
known ine¢ ciency of commodity money: maintaining a commodity standard
29Rolnick, Velde, and Weber (1996) extensively document this ￿puzzling￿phenomenon
in the case of medieval England and France. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that this
puzzle can sometimes be explained by the arithmetic of debasements. They also argue
that gains to debtors resulting from debasements should not have been ￿renegotiation-
proof,￿in the sense that creditors and debtors should have been able to strike contracts
that allowed for side payments in the event of a debasement. We note that in the context
of 17th-century Amsterdam, such contracts would have involved at least one third party, a
cashier, making the negotiation and enforcement of such contracts potentially quite costly.
27imposes an opportunity cost on money holders. The point of the foregoing
analysis is to demonstrate the manner in which this ine¢ ciency was prone
to manifest itself, given the institutions of Early Modern Europe.
4.1 Debasement with multiple mints
We now consider the e⁄ects of a debasement in an economy where coins
from competing mints circulate. For simplicity we focus on an economy with
only two mints, each of which produces a single coin. Call these coins the
￿rixdollar￿(coin ￿) and ￿cross rixdollar￿(coin ￿), and denote their initial
silver contents, seigniorage rates, and minting-ordinance values as br(bc);
￿r(￿c), and er(ec) respectively.
Up until time t, the economy is in a steady-state monetary equilibrium
satisfying Condition 1, that supports a golden-rule allocation that requires
no exports (by Corollary 3 this is possible if ￿, 1￿￿r; and 1￿￿c are small
enough). The steady-state coin stocks are given by mr > 0 and mc > 0. Let
us suppose that coin ￿ that circulates at its minting-ordinance value, i.e.,
we have ec = ec and er ￿ er. Under Condition 1, the legal minting point of
coin ￿ exceeds that of coin ￿. The steady-state money stock is given by
M = ermr + ecmc (36)
At the beginning of period t, the mint producing cross rixdollars an-
nounces a debasement of the cross rixdollar from bc to b0
c < bc ; the metal
content of the rixdollar does not change.30 As in the single-coin case, a
su¢ ciently severe debasement may lead to melting of the old coinage and
minting of the new. Either one coin or both may be melted, according to
interactions between the drop in the silver content of the cross rixdollar,
and the ￿ orin value that agents place on the rixdollar. Let e0
r and e0
c be the
￿ orin values assigned to the two coins following the debasement. Supposing
that e0









(cf. condition (33)), and rixdollars will be melted down and minted into
30Another form of debasement was commonly practiced in the early years of the Republic
(Korthals Altes, chapter 3). This was to ￿lighten￿domestic coinage by passing a minting
ordinance that assigned a higher ￿ orin value to domestic coins, while keeping the ￿ orin
value of foreign coins at existing values. An analysis very similar to that presented below
could also be applied to this second sort of debasement.
28cross rixdollars as long as
e0
r
br (1 ￿ ￿)
<





(cf. condition (6)). The following result more precisely characterizes the
e⁄ects of an unanticipated debasement of the cross rixdollar.
Proposition 6 In the two-coin economy, suppose that coin ￿ is subject
to an unanticipated debasement in which the seignorage rate ￿c does not
change, i.e., ￿0
c = ￿c. Then if condition (37) holds, condition (38) holds for
e0
r = er, and endowments are su¢ ciently large: (i) The economy can return
to a new steady-state monetary equilibrium after a one-period transition,
where the equilibrium allocation again corresponds to the golden-rule alloca-
tion. (ii) In the new equilibrium, only the debased coin circulates, and both
prices and the nominal money stock are (weakly) higher than in the origi-
nal equilibrium. (iii) The transition to the new equilibrium will sometimes
require the export of goods and additional minting of the debased coin.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 provides an example of ￿Gresham￿ s Law,￿in which ￿bad￿
money (debased coin) drives out ￿good￿(the non-debased or ￿full-weight￿
coin), in the sense that the full weight coin is completely eliminated from
circulation. As discussed above, the historical record suggests that Gre-
sham￿ s Law was often violated in practice, i.e., debasements did not always
drive out full-weight coin, but instead resulted in its continued circulation
at a value exceeding its legal value. This phenomenon can be captured in
the model if we allow the ￿ orin value of the full-weight coin to appreciate
following a debasement of the competing coin.
Corollary 7 If e0
r can appreciate in response to the debasement of coin ￿,
then both coins can circulate in the new equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Implications
The sort of ￿predatory￿debasements modeled above were common during
the early years of the Dutch Republic. A well-designed debasement (or
for that matter, a convincing counterfeit by an illicit mint) could be used
29to extract silver from the Dutch economy. In the model, the cost of such
extractions is borne not only by the creditors unfortunate enough to be
repaid in debased coin, but also by agents who must export goods in order
to obtain su¢ cient coinage for future transactions.
The much despised practices of bicquetteeren and steygeringhe can be
seen as market responses to debasements. Following a debasement, people
often chose to hold back full-weight coins and export them (possibly for rem-
inting into debased coin). In the model, this response is optimal if condition
(38) holds. On the other hand, for a su¢ cient increase in the ￿ orin value
of the full-weight coin, it becomes optimal for debtors to retain these coins.
Such ￿overvaluation,￿in e⁄ect, transfers a portion of the seigniorage revenue
from a surprise debasement away from the debasing mint and to the holders
of the full-weight coin. In the model, Corollary 7 shows that such ￿over-
valuation￿of the heavy coin can be consistent with a new equilibrium, as
long as agents share a common belief in its occurrence. Overvaluation alone
cannot eliminate incentives to debase, however, since the unit of account
(the ￿ orin) remains e⁄ectively tied to the ￿lightest￿coin in circulation.
The model is also consistent with the assertions of monetary historians
(e.g., Polak 1998, Korthals Altes 2001) that the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth century debasement of the ￿ orin did not result from ￿arbitrage￿
(the melting and exporting of heavy coin) but instead from foreign trade,
particularly trade with the southern or Spanish Netherlands. In Corollary
7, no heavy coin is melted in response to a debasement. Instead, goods are
exported in order to make additional silver available for coinage, and the
new coinage is always of light coin. An unanticipated debasement could
therefore result in both a stimulus to exports and an in￿ ux of ￿foreign￿coin
(i.e., coin minted just across the southern border of the Republic), as is often
described in historical accounts of the period.
The ability of competing mints to engage in predatory debasements
amounted to a power to place a destructive tax on the economic activities
of the Dutch Republic and its surrounding economies. A partial solution
to this problem would have been a prohibition on the use of foreign coins.
Lacking the power to enforce such a prohibition, the Republic was reduced
to reforming its minting ordinances, so as to bring them closer in line with
market valuations. Such e⁄orts were insu¢ cient, however, since successive
minting ordinances did nothing to change the mints￿incentives to debase.
The model thus illustrates the in￿ ationary tendencies of the Dutch mon-
etary system prior to Amsterdam￿ s creation of the Wisselbank: an unan-
ticipated debasement can result in an increase in prices proportionately as
large as the debasement. From Table 1, however, it is clear that debase-
30ments alone cannot explain the movements in prices in the 100 years or so
before the Wisselbank￿ s founding. Prices rose during the ￿rst half of the
16th century, when monetary standards were stable. In the second half of
the 16th century, the average rate of in￿ ation was approximately double the
average rate of monetary debasement.
One traditional explanation for the price increases of the sixteenth cen-
tury focuses on the increased availability of precious metals from the New
World. In the model such increased availability shows up as increases in the
world prices of consumption goods, i.e., ￿ and !. Such an increase results in
a northeastward shift in feasible price regions (e.g., Fi and Fg shown in Fig-
ure 2), putting upward pressure on prices. To accommodate this increase
in prices, the nominal stock of money would have had to increase. This
would have been accomplished in two ways: by additional minting of coin,
with light coins being minted ￿rst (coin g in the Figure 2 example), and by
increasing market valuations of (heavy) coin (coin i in Figure 2).
Increased availability of precious metals worked in conjunction with de-
basements to result in increased prices and ￿overvalued￿heavy coinage. But
in the Dutch case, at least, it is clear that a decline in the world price of
silver cannot tell the whole story: the debasements of the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries signi￿cantly contribute to the overall rate
of increase in the silver equivalent price of goods (Table 1).
6 The model with an exchange bank
The model is now modi￿ed to include an exchange bank that resembles the
Wisselbank in a number of key respects. In order to keep the notation man-
ageable, the set of coins is restricted to the two coins ￿ and ￿ considered
above. We focus on the operations of the Wisselbank in its mature form,
i.e., the period from 1683 onwards, after the o¢ cial recognition of the dis-
tinction between bank money and current money, and after the introduction
of receipts.
In this modi￿ed version of the model, the settlement function of the
cashiers is taken over by the exchange bank. The exchange bank issues two
forms of liabilities, bank balances which are not redeemable in coin, and
receipts which are. Like the Wisselbank, the exchange bank is willing to
trade bank funds for receipts. We abstract from the miniscule redemption
fee actually charged by Wisselbank, and suppose that the exchange bank is
willing to exchange receipts for bank funds one-for-one.
In Stage 3 of each period, old debtors bring receipts they have received
31from sales of their endowment goods in each period. Since they need bank
balances to settle the bills they drew last period, they exchange these receipts
at the Wisselbank for bank balances. In Stage 4 the old debtors transfer
these balances to old creditors, who then exchange them for receipts. The
receipts can be taken to the debtor islands and traded for the endowment
goods of young debtors.
A key distinction between the exchange bank and the cashiers in the
previous section is that balances on accounts at the exchange bank become
the e⁄ective numeraire for all transactions. More speci￿cally, exchange bank
balances are denominated in banco ￿ orins. An agent may obtain an advance
of bank funds by posting either heavy money or current money as collateral
with the bank. The agent also obtains a transferable receipt entitling him to
return of the coins posted. If a posted coin i is deemed to be heavy money,
then the bank credits the agent ei banco ￿ orins per coin, i.e., the agent is
credited for the minting-ordinance value of the coin. On the other hand, if a
posted coin i is deemed to be current money, then the agent is credited ￿ei
banco ￿ orins per coin, where ￿ = 1=(1 + a) and a is the agio or premium
on banco versus current ￿ orins. In terms of current ￿ orins, a heavy-money
coin i would be worth (1 + a)ei current ￿ orins while a current-money coin
would be worth ei current ￿ orins.
Following late 17th-century practice, prices are now denominated in
banco ￿ orins. As in the previous section, we assume that the legal minting
point of coin ￿ exceeds that of coin ￿, so that rixdollars are full-weight and
cross rixdollars are current money. The stock of circulating receipts at the
beginning of time t is then given by
￿t = ermr;t + ￿ecmc;t (39)
where mi;t denotes the quantity of coins of type i posted at the exchange
bank. Barring any redemptions of the receipts, or posting of additional coin
at the Wisselbank, the stock of bank balances outstanding at the end of
Stage 3 of period t is also given by ￿t.
The representative debtor￿ s and creditor￿ s problems remain much the
same as above, except that in (18), (19), (26), and (27), ect and ert are
constrained to equal ￿ec and er respectively. The following result is then
straightforward.
Proposition 8 In the two-coin economy with an exchange bank, suppose
that (1￿￿i) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2 for i = ￿;￿ and ￿ > 0 is su¢ ciently small. Then for
some agio on banco ￿orins a > 0 the golden-rule allocation can be supported
as a steady-state monetary equilibrium, in which stocks of both coins remain
32at the exchange bank, debtor goods are purchased with receipts, and creditor
goods are purchased with bills settled in bank funds.
Proof. (Sketch). As in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, the key is to
make sure that agents have no incentive to mint or melt either coin (in this
case, after redeeming a receipt). This can be done if the bank chooses the
agio a such that the minting points of the two coins are identical, i.e., choose













The rest of the proof proceeds as in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3.
In other words, a judicious choice of agio could always allow both ￿heavy￿
and ￿light￿coins to be valued in exchange. Note that neither type of coin
need actually circulate, only the receipts for these coins.
The true value of the agio lay in its ability to be upwardly adjusted
in response to a downward shift in the metallic content of current money.
Suppose that the economy is in the steady-state equilibrium described in
Proposition 8, and that the metal content of coin ￿ is unexpectedly decreased
from bc to b0
c. In response, the exchange bank could announce an increase in
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respectively. Evidently, for a su¢ cient increase in the agio (su¢ ciently large
￿0), neither condition is satis￿ed and agents have no incentive to redeem
receipts, withdraw coins, and have them reminted. Moreover, the agio can
always be adjusted so that the minting point for the debased coin ￿ will
exactly equal the minting point coin ￿ before the debasement, i.e., so that
for example condition (40) will continue to hold after the debasement.
These considerations prove the following:
Proposition 9 In the two-coin economy with an exchange bank, suppose
that the economy is in a steady-state monetary equilibrium described in
Proposition 8. If coin ￿ is subject to an unanticipated debasement in which
the seignorage rate ￿c does not change, then so long as the agio on banco
33money increases su¢ ciently: (i) the original equilibrium remains an equi-
librium, and (ii) neither coin is melted and reminted in response to the
debasement.
Mints￿incentives to debase can thus be curtailed under a monetary sys-
tem in which debts are denominated in bank money and settled on the books
of an exchange bank. Under this arrangement, exchange bank money be-
comes the numeraire, and changes in the metal content of ￿current money￿
become irrelevant for agents￿decisions.
A relevant question is whether a stable unit of account could have been
achieved by some other means, in particular more frequent revision of the
minting ordinances. In response, we would argue that the great advantage
of a bank money standard was that the agio on bank money could and did
adjust with market conditions. The relative speed with which the agio varied
served as a better signal of commitment to a ￿xed monetary standard, than
the Republic￿ s vague predilection towards occasional revision of its minting
ordinances.
6.1 Comparison with the ￿standard formula￿
The role of Wisselbank money as a ￿virtual currency￿bears a certain re-
semblance to Cipolla￿ s (1956) ￿standard formula￿for the issue of multiple-
denomination coins under a commodity monetary standard. This formula
calls for an explicit commodity standard to be maintained for only a single,
large-denomination coin. Additional coins are issued as inherently worth-
less, di¢ cult-to-counterfeit tokens redeemable at a ￿xed rate of exchange
with the reference coin.
Sargent and Velde (2002) provide numerous historical examples of how
failure to adhere to this formula led to debasement and/or disappearance of
precious-metal coins. In their account, the driving force behind this mon-
etary instability is the speci￿c role of small-denomination coins in certain
transactions, i.e., everyday small-value transactions that can only be settled
with small denomination coins. By the early 20th century, these problems
were ameliorated after most major economies adopted the standard for-
mula.31
Three centuries earlier, the Dutch Republic came quite close to replicat-
ing Cipolla￿ s recommendation. By e⁄ectively imposing a legal requirement
31The ￿rst statement of the standard formula is attributed to a proposal by the master
of the London Mint, Sir Henry Slingsby, in 1661. Slingsby was no doubt familiar with the
the experience of the Bank of Amsterdam, which may have in￿ uenced his views on token
money.
34that ￿nancial transactions be settled at the Wisselbank, Amsterdam ul-
timately created a sort of ￿virtual token coin￿in the form of bank money
redeemable in heavy coin. Counterfeiting was ruled out since money created
by the Wisselbank only existed as bank balances.
With the emergence of the banco ￿ orin as a separate and dominant unit
of account, however, Wisselbank money eventually surpassed its role as a
redeemable token currency. As the banco ￿ orin became the e⁄ective nu-
meraire for ￿nancial transactions within the Dutch Republic, the monetary
role of coin was deemphasized, while central bank money assumed an un-
precedented preeminence.
7 Conclusion
Today central banks are commonly thought of as entities that issue notes,
operate a discount window, and conduct open market operations in gov-
ernment securities. However, central banks evolved from an earlier type of
institution, a trusted cashier or ￿exchange bank￿for the settlement of com-
mercial transactions. The Bank of Amsterdam or Wisselbank formed the
crucial link between exchange banks and the central banks that would follow.
Like the exchange banks, it served as a trusted cashier, but it also came to
provide an ￿arti￿cial￿numeraire good that served as a stable store of value.
Critical to the success of the Wisselbank was its creation of a separate unit
of account not tied to any particular coin, but instead to the liabilities of
a public institution. This success of this idea did not require the issue of
notes, a discount window, or purchases of bonds, but instead derived from
the Wisselbank￿ s legal monopoly on the operation of a large-value payment
system within the city of Amsterdam.
The initial impetus for this innovation was to control the problems as-
sociated with the Dutch Republic￿ s lack of a standardized coinage, and the
attendant incentives of local governments to engage in debasements. The
model presented above illustrates how such incentives could arise, and how
the introduction of central bank money served to blunt these incentives.
Our argument is not meant to suggest that the price stability engendered
by the Wisselbank was an automatic consequence of the founding of a central
bank. Crucial to the success of the Wisselbank was the strong political
support it enjoyed. Other institutions conceived along the same lines as
the Wisselbank, did not always enjoy the same degree of political support
and enjoyed less success in terms of currency stabilization. Moreover, the
Wisselbank ultimately became illiquid at the end of 18th century, as the
35value of its backing assets (which by then included large amounts of the
debt of the Dutch East India Company) declined and Amsterdam fell to
France in 1798. The Wisselbank￿ s downfall, however, came only after it had
provided the Dutch Republic with over a century of stable prices: then as
now, an enviable accomplishment in the real world of monetary policy.
368 Appendix A: Proofs
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Initially suppose there is only one coin so that I = fgg. Let MRS￿ be
the steady-state marginal rate of substitution implied by the golden-rule
allocation, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution given in (16).
Suppose further that the golden-rule allocation does not involve trade
















x=MRS￿. Then as long as (1 ￿ ￿g) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that p￿
x and P￿
y satisfy no-arbitrage conditions (4)-(10) with
strict inequality in all cases, i.e., no minting, melting, or trade with the world
market occurs. Under these prices, ￿rst-order conditions for the debtor￿ s and
creditor￿ s problem can also be shown to hold for the consumptions in the
golden-rule allocation, again with strict inequality for ￿ su¢ ciently small.
Now suppose that the golden-rule allocation requires exporting debtor
goods to the world market in return for creditor goods. This allocation can















It is again straightforward to show that no-arbitrage and ￿rst-order condi-
tions will hold at the golden-rule allocation. However, the ￿rst-order con-
dition (23) and the ￿rst part of no-arbitrage condition (10) will hold with
equality in this case.
If the golden-rule allocation requires exporting creditor goods, the sup-
porting monetary equilibrium can be constructed in a symmetric fashion.
Now consider the more general case where I ￿ fgg. Then if we take
e = e, then the monetary equilibrium described above exists, where only






agents have no incentive to mint any
other coin, since the minting point of g is by de￿nition at least as great













chosen so that there is no incentive for agents to melt coin g. Therefore an
equilibrium exists where the entire money stock consists of coin g.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 3
Let H be the set of all coins i for which (1 ￿ ￿i) < (1 ￿ ￿)
2. Choose e as






ei if i = g or i 2 I n H
egbi(1￿￿g)
bg(1￿￿i) ￿ ei if i 2 H n fgg
(46)
which aligns the minting points of coins in H with the minting point of
coin g, and sets the minting points of all coins in I n H to be below the
minting point of g: It can then be veri￿ed that there exists some coin h 2 H
s.t. Fh (e￿) =
T
i2H Fi(e￿). Mimicking the proof of the Proposition and
substituting e￿
h for eg, we can now choose (p￿
x;P￿
y) 2 Fh(e￿) that will support
the golden-rule allocation. At these prices there is no incentive to mint any
coin, and there is no incentive to melt any coin in H; therefore an equilibrium
exists in which all coins in H circulate.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Let m denote the initial equilibrium stock of coins and p￿
x and P￿
y be the
initial equilibrium prices of debtor and creditor goods, respectively. Follow-
ing the debasement, the stock of coins increases (weakly) to ^ m. We consider
three candidate new equilibria.
Candidate equilibrium 1 (No goods are exported). As initial candidates
for the new steady-state equilibrium stock of coins and prices m0;p0
x;P0
y, take

















Since this involves just a proportional increase in money and prices, there
will be a new steady-state monetary equilibrium with the same equilibrium
allocation before, as long as p0
x and P0
y satisfy no-arbitrage conditions (34)
and (35). If these are satis￿ed, the economy can promptly move to the
38new steady-state monetary equilibrium, except during the transition period





in terms of debtor goods. Since the time-t old debtors and creditors (the
￿initial old￿following a surprise debasement) have unit elasticity of demand
for young debtors￿goods, ￿rst-order conditions for young debtors and cred-
itors, and market clearing are una⁄ected by this reallocation.
Candidate equilibrium 2 (Time-t young debtors export). The above
choices for p0
x and P0
y may not always be feasible, however. Suppose for
example that in the initial equilibrium, the price of debtor goods is given by
p￿
x =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
b
(51)
Then (34) requires that for p0




￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 (52)
Hence feasibility requires that the ratio of the new price p0
x to the old price p￿
x





















x given in (48) cannot be feasible.
In such cases, we can construct new equilibrium prices and a new equi-
librium money stock as follows. Suppose that in the initial equilibrium, the









(if this condition is violated, we must consider another new equilibrium,
Candidate Equilibrium 3 below). If (55) is satis￿ed, choose a candidate new
equilibrium debtor good price as the lowest price that will satisfy (34), i.e.,
p0
x =
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 (56)
39and choose P0














y satisfy (34) and (35). And, since money and
prices shift proportionately, it is again straightforward to verify that there
is a new steady-state monetary equilibrium with coin stock m0 and prices
p0
x and P0
y, with the same equilibrium allocation as the old steady-state
monetary equilibrium. During the transition period t, old debtors (creditors)
will have a windfall gain (loss) given by (50), and young debtors will need
to obtain n = (m0 ￿ ^ m) additional rixdollars. They do this by exporting
(m0 ￿ ^ m)b0
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
(59)
of their endowment good to the world market. This will be feasible as long
as debtors￿endowments are su¢ ciently large. Once again, since only the
period t old are a⁄ected, there is no change in agents￿￿rst-order conditions
or in market-clearing conditions.
Candidate equilibrium 3 (Time-t young creditors and possibly young
debtors export). Suppose that candidate equilibrium 1 is not feasible but
that the domestic relative price of debtor goods in the initial equilibrium









Choose a candidate new equilibrium creditor good price as the lowest price
that will satisfy (35), i.e.,
P0
y =
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 (61)
and choose p0












y satisfy (34) and (35). And, since money and
prices shift proportionately, it is again straightforward to verify that there
40is a new steady-state monetary equilibrium (from t + 1 onwards) with coin
stock m0 and prices p0
x and P0
y, with the same equilibrium allocation as
the old steady-state monetary equilibrium. However it can also be shown
that these prices do not clear markets during the transition period t. After
















! (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 0; (64)
where c￿
y denotes the creditors￿consumption of their endowment good under




x;0;m0 ￿ b m
￿
< 0 (65)







market-clearing values for pxt and Pyt we consider two cases:
Case 1. There exists b px 2 [
￿(1￿￿0)(1￿￿)
b0 ;p0
x) s.t. h(b px;0;m0 ￿ b m) = 0.
Then choose pxt = b px and Pyt = P0
y. In this case young creditors export
goods in time t, su¢ cient to mint ￿t = m0 ￿ b m new rixdollars. Time t
young debtors face lower prices for their endowment goods than debtors in
subsequent generations.
Case 2. There is no such b px in which case from (65) and continuity of h
it must be case that
h
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 ;0;m0 ￿ b m
￿
< 0 (66)
But it can also be shown that
h
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 ;m0 ￿ b m;0
￿
> 0 (67)
which implies that there exists some b n 2 (0;m0 ￿ b m) such that
h
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
b0 ;b n;m0 ￿ b m ￿ b n
￿
= 0 (68)
implying that time t markets will clear for pxt =
￿(1￿￿0)(1￿￿)
b0 and Pyt = P0
y.
In this case, both young creditors and young debtors export goods at time
t in order to coin additional rixdollars.
418.4 Proof of Proposition 6
(Sketch) Take e0
r = er. The proof then exactly parallels the proof of Proposi-
tion 5, replacing the reminting incentive condition (33) with conditions (37)
and (38).
8.5 Proof of Corollary 7
(Sketch) In the original equilibrium, conditions (4), (5), (7), and (8) must
be satis￿ed for coins C and R. Rewrite these conditions as bounds on the
coin weights bi=ei for i = ￿;￿







px (1 ￿ ￿)
(69)







Py (1 ￿ ￿)
(70)
Following a transition to the new equilibrium, prices px and Py increase by
a factor of proportionality k > 1, i.e., p0
x = kpx and P0
y = kPy. Since br and
￿r do not change as a result of the debasement, then for coin R to circulate
at ￿ orin value e0
r in the new equilibrium we must have








kpx (1 ￿ ￿)
(71)








kPy (1 ￿ ￿)
(72)
If we take e0
r = ker;conditions (71) and (72) are identical to (69) and (70)
and are clearly satis￿ed; the rest of the proof is straightforward.
429 Appendix B: Chronology of the Bank of Ams-
terdam
￿ 1543: Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, introduces the silver ￿ orin of
20 stuivers; the coin quickly disappears but the ￿ orin perists as a unit
of account
￿ 1568: Revolt against Spain begins, widespread debasement of coinage
￿ 1579: Union of Utrecht, beginning of the Dutch Republic (United
Provinces); coinage ￿standardized￿but this is ine⁄ective and debase-
ment continues
￿ 1586: a new minting ordinance attempts to reset the nominal values
of circulating coinage
￿ 1606: another minting ordinance
￿ 1609: Beginning of the Twelve Years￿Truce with Spain; Bank of Am-
sterdam (Wisselbank) founded; cashiers outlawed in Amsterdam
￿ 1621: Cashiers allowed again in Amsterdam
￿ 1622: New minting ordinance forces the Wisselbank to recognize the
cross rixdollar
￿ 1638: Another new minting ordinance
￿ 1648: Treaty of Westphalia, end of Revolt
￿ 1659: New minting ordinance o¢ cially recognizes the distinction be-
tween the current ￿ orin and the banco ￿ orin; the agio on the banco
￿ orin reaches 5 percent
￿ 1672: French invasion, the Wisselbank withstands a run on its de-
posits; agio stabilizes between 4 and 5 percent
￿ 1683: The Wisselbank o⁄ers advances against gold or silver
￿ 1716-21: John Law￿ s System operative in France; Wisselbank balances
rapidly increase as bullion is imported into the Netherlands; balances
peak at almost 29 million ￿ orins in 1721
￿ 1720s: The Wisselbank begins to hold signi￿cant amounts of the debt
of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
43￿ 1756-63: Seven Years￿War; the Wisselbank ￿eases￿the agio to 2 per-
cent
￿ 1763: Financial panic; the following year balances reach an all-time
high of almost 31 million ￿ orins
￿ 1780-84: War between the Republic and England; the Bank extends
large loans to the VOC and the City of Amsterdam; agio can no longer
be maintained; value of bank money falls 10 percent
￿ 1796-1806: Republic is dissolved; public investigation of the ￿nancial
condition of the Wisselbank; advances prohibited in 1802; balances fall
to 5.2 million ￿ orins by 1806
￿ 1806: Kingdom of the Netherlands is established
￿ 1814: The Kingdom of the Netherlands establishes a national central
bank (De Nederlandsche Bank)
￿ 1820: Wisselbank liquidated
4410 Appendix C: Selected Historical Balance Sheets
of the Bank of Amsterdam
All ￿gures are given in (banco) ￿ orins, rounded to the nearest ￿ orin. Source
is van Dillen (1925), Volume II. The latter two balance sheets obviously do
not take into account the option value of the receipts issued against deposits
of coin or precious metal.
10.1 Balance sheet of February 1, 1610
Assets:
Coins and other








Due to municipal treasury 120,000
Total 925,562
4510.2 Balance sheet of January 28, 1720
Assets:
Coins and other





















4610.3 Balance sheet of January 14, 1764
Assets:
Coins and other
precious metal in vault 30,835,194
Of which:















Earnings retained from 119,655
1763 operations
Total 31,062,458
4711 Appendix D: Glossary of relevant money and
banking terms
(Where appropriate, equivalent Dutch terms are given in parentheses)
Agio (opgeld). The premium at which bank money traded relative to
current money.
Bank (or banco) ￿ orin (or guilder) (bankgulden or gulden banco). The
unit of account for bank money.
Bank money (bankgeld). Money in the deposit accounts of the Bank
of Amsterdam or similar exchange banks. The distinction between bank
money and current money arose spontaneously shortly after the founding
of the Bank of Amsterdam in 1609, but was not legally recognized until the
minting ordinance of 1659.
Bank of Amsterdam (Amsterdamsche Wisselbank). The exchange
bank in Amsterdam, the principal exchange bank in northern Europe dur-
ing much of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Bank of Amsterdam was a
municipal institution, created by the city council of Amsterdam.
Bill of exchange (wisselbrief ). The principal payment and credit in-
strument during the period of the Bank of Amsterdam. A bill of exchange re-
sembles a check that is payable at some term (then called ￿usance￿ ). Credit
was typically extended by a creditor (called a ￿deliverer￿ ) delivering some-
thing of value (money or goods) to a debtor (￿taker￿ ) in return for a bill.
The party the bill was drawn on, known as the payer, was often an agent of
the taker in another city.
Bicquetteeren (perhaps best translated as ￿cherry-picking￿ ). The
practice of ￿picking out￿heavier coins, usually for melting, export, or pay-
ing out at a premium (see steygeringhe). Cashiers were commonly thought
to be the most accomplished practitioners of bicquetteeren.
Cashier (Kassier). A private ￿bank￿which exchanged coins or o⁄ered
payment services (roughly equivalent to modern ￿checking accounts￿in the
U.S.). Unlike modern banks, cashiers did not extend signi￿cant amounts of
commercial credit.
Current (or cash) ￿ orin (or guilder) (courante gulden or kasgulden).
The unit of account for current money.
Current money (courantgeld). Money in the form of coin or in cashiers￿
accounts.
Exchange bank (wisselbank). A public (usually municipal) bank for
the settlement of commercial obligations.
Legal value (muntkoers). Florin value assigned to a coin by a minting
48ordinance.
Market value (marktkoers). Florin value at which a coin actually cir-
culated.
Mint equivalent. Florins per unit of weight of precious metal contained
in a coin. Commonly expressed as ￿ orins/mark, where 8 troy ounces = 1
mark.
Mint price. Florins returned from minting of a coin, per unit weight of
precious metal sent to the mint.
Minting ordinance (muntordonnantie). A law of the Dutch Republic,
assigning a nominal value in ￿ orins to coins known to be circulating in the
Republic.
Receipt (recepis or ontvangstbewijs). After 1683, document issued to
a party depositing coin or precious metal at the Bank of Amsterdam. The
receipt entitled the holder to repurchase the deposited coin or precious metal,
after a ￿xed amount of time, for a small premium.
Seigniorage (sleischat). Money earned per unit weight of precious
metal sent to a mint for coinage. Above, we express seigniorage as a frac-
tion of the ￿ orin value of each coin. In practice, seigniorage had to be large
enough to cover the costs of producing the coin, known in both Dutch and
English as ￿brassage.￿
Steygeringhe (perhaps best translated as ￿gouging￿ ). The practice,
especially of cashiers, of circulating coins above at a value above their legal
value.
Weight (of a coin) (muntvoet). The ratio of the coin￿ s precious metal
content to its nominal value, or the inverse of its mint equivalent. Commonly
expressed as grams per ￿ orin.
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